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Abstract— Intrusion/misbehavior detection and response
are two important components for defending against various
attacks in mobile ad hoc networks. Unfortunately, there
is a gap between local intrusion/misbehavior detection and
network-wide response in such networks. To bridge this gap,
alert propagation, aiming to spread alert messages to the
whole network upon detection of malicious/abnormal activ-
ity, is a viable solution but has been overlooked. Epidemic
routing schemes are available to propagate messages to the
entire network. However, alert propagation cannot simply
rely on epidemic routing schemes only, because these schemes
can be utilized by malicious nodes (slanderers) to defame
other network nodes to issue DoS attacks. In this paper, we
present a novel protocol for alert propagation, called Mobi-
Herald. To achieve high coverage of message delivery, we
design a novel mobility-assisted epidemic routing scheme to
propagate alert messages efficiently. To defend against slan-
der attack, our Mobi-Herald alert propagation scheme adopts
threshold-based verification against collusive slanderers. To
ensure transmission efficiency, we use control parameter
times-to-send (TTS) to limit unnecessary transmissions. We
evaluate the Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol through
both theoretical analysis and simulation. We conclude that
Mobi-Herald achieves excellent coverage of message delivery
with small message overhead and reasonable alert propaga-
tion delay.
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for pervasive and ubiquitous communications
makes mobile wireless ad hoc networks (MANETs) in-
creasingly attractive. However, due to the shared-medium
nature of wireless links, an adversary can easily intercept
legitimate traffic, tamper with original traffic, or inject
superfluous traffic in a wireless ad hoc network to de-
grade the performance of the network. To deal with such
malicious attacks in MANETs, attack detection schemes
[1], [2], [3] have been proposed. Usually only surrounding
nodes of a malicious node are likely to detect its intru-
sion/misbehavior. As long as the surrounding nodes of
an attacker become aware of intrusion/misbehavior of the
attacker, they can adapt routing behavior to prevent/nullify
future attacks. However, an attacker (or a malicious node)
may move arbitrarily, and it can be a neighbor of any
friendly node in a mobile ad hoc network. Therefore, to
trigger network-wide reaction against malicious attacks,
almost all network nodes need to be aware of the malicious
node. Alert propagation schemes are required to fill the
gap between local “intrusion/misbehavior detection” and
network-wide “response”.
It is challenging to design an efficient, reliable and
robust alert propagation scheme in MANETs. First, the
alert propagation scheme must be efficient in terms of
aggregate bandwidth consumption. Second, the alert prop-
agation must be reliable so that each alert message should
reach almost all network nodes, even when a network is
subjected to failures, packet loss, and intermittent parti-
tion. Third, an alert propagation scheme must be able to
defend against a slander attack, which is an attack to
defame a friendly node in the network. Otherwise, the
alert propagation scheme can be utilized by malicious
nodes to defame friendly nodes and cause them to be
isolated by others in the network. This is essentially a
type of denial-of-service (DoS) attack. Fourth, the alert
propagation should be robust under dynamic environ-
ments. In a wireless mobile ad hoc network environment,
topology and neighborhood information are dynamic. Both
malicious nodes and friendly nodes move continually,
hence the maintenance of frequently changing topology
and neighborhood information incurs a large overhead.
Epidemic routing schemes are available to propagate
messages to an entire network. Previous effort on epidemic
routing protocols focuses on two classes: (1) flooding [4],
[5] and its variations [6], [7], [8], [9]; and (2) mobility-
assisted epidemic routing for intermittently connected
networks [10], [11]. Flooding-based epidemic routing
protocols require relatively high node density to ensure
reliability of message delivery (so that a message can
be delivered to the whole network). Existing mobility-
assisted epidemic routing protocols, which are typically
designed for sparse networks or frequently partitioned
networks, offer reliable message delivery. However, these
epidemic routing schemes alone are unable to meet the
requirements of alert propagation, including transmission
efficiency, reliability, defense against slander attacks, and
robustness.
In this paper, we first present a novel mobility-assisted
epidemic routing scheme. Then, we generalize it for alert
propagation in mobile ad hoc networks by suppress-
ing illegitimate alert messages generated by slanderers.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
on alert propagation in mobile ad hoc networks. There
are three components involved in our alert propagation
protocol: mobility-assisted epidemic routing, threshold-
based verification and alert propagation management.
Mobility-assisted epidemic routing is the underlying com-
ponent which aims to disseminate messages to all network
nodes efficiently. In our mobility-assisted epidemic routing
scheme, a herald is defined as a mobile node which
actively participates in message dissemination. A mobile
herald periodically transmits a message to be propagated
in its neighborhood. With mobility of the herald and its
periodical retransmissions, a message can be disseminated
to the whole network efficiently. In the mobility-assisted
epidemic routing scheme, a times-to-send (TTS) field is
included in the header of a message. In each period,
when a mobile herald retransmits a message, TTS value is
reduced by one. When TTS reaches zero, a node stops
forwarding the message. Hence, the alert propagation
procedure on the herald node is terminated. Threshold-
based verification is employed to defend against slan-
der attacks. A friendly node must have received enough
alert messages regarding an alert, before it can trust the
alert message and participate in further alert propagation.
Alert propagation management is designed to control
termination of a periodic alert propagation procedure by
determining the parameter TTS, so that an alert message
can be disseminated with a high probability to all network
nodes with small message overhead. Intuitively, a larger
TTS implies a larger number of retransmissions, and thus it
is likely that the message will reach more nodes. However,
more retransmissions incur more message overhead. To
reduce message overhead, we use the minimum TTS that
ensures almost all nodes can finally receive the alert
message in alert propagation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II reviews related work and introduces the background of
this paper. Section III describes our proposed architecture
of Mobi-Herald alert propagation and sets the context
of our work. Section IV introduces the mobility-assisted
epidemic routing scheme. Section V shows the threshold-
based verification used to defend against malicious slander
attacks in the system. Section VI describes how we can
determine a minimum TTS for alert propagation. Section
VII evaluates performance of the Mobi-Herald protocol
based on simulation results. We conclude the paper in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first summarize the two categories
of existing epidemic routing protocols: flooding-based
protocols, and mobility-assisted epidemic routing proto-
cols. Then we review some existing work supporting alert
propagation.
A. Epidemic Routing Schemes
1) Flooding and Its Variations: Several variations of
the flooding protocol are available. Due to message re-
dundancy, flooding consumes scarce bandwidth resources
in a wireless ad hoc network, leads to heavy contention,
and causes packet loss over wireless links. To reduce
message redundancy, several schemes have been proposed:
In probabilistic or counter-based schemes [6], [12], [13],
nodes rebroadcast a message with probability p. A pre-
determined p is used in [6]. However, in sparse networks
the probabilistic scheme with a predetermined p cannot
guarantee that all nodes in the network can receive a
broadcasting message. The flooding schemes usually trade
off reliability for efficiency in terms of communication
overhead. Mistral [9] introduces a scheme to achieve
balance between efficiency and reliability. Mistral uses
probabilistic flooding as a base line, but compensates for
dropped messages by periodically broadcasting compensa-
tion messages, each of which consists of a set of dropped
messages. In neighborhood knowledge based schemes,
nodes update their neighbor list by periodically sending
“HELLO” messages. Self pruning protocol [15] requires
that each node have knowledge of its one-hop neighbors.
A sender of a broadcast message includes its neighbor
list in the header of the message. Upon receiving the
message, a node compares its neighbor list to the sender’s
neighbor list. If the node can reach additional nodes by
rebroadcasting the message, it rebroadcasts the message;
otherwise the message is dropped. Scalable Broadcast Al-
gorithm (SBA) [7] and Double Covered Broadcast (DCB)
[8] both require two-hop neighbor knowledge, but use
different methods to select a set of nodes to rebroadcast
a message. In MANETs, nodes may move constantly and
neighborhood information changes very frequently. In this
case, it is very expensive to maintain neighbor lists.
2) Mobility-Assisted Epidemic Routing: The simplest
of the mobility-assisted routing schemes is to let a source
node deliver a message to its destination node only when
the nodes are within transmission range of each other.
Such a scheme has minimal communication overhead.
However, delay of such scheme can be very large. A “two-
hop relay” scheme has been proposed in [16], where a
source node randomly chooses a relay node within its one
hop distance to forward a message, so that the relay node
can send the message to the destination node when the two
nodes come within transmission range of each other. The
message path is at most two hops long. Although the “two-
hop relay” scheme achieves a Θ(1) capacity per node,
a long message delivery delay is expected. Along this
direction, various trade-offs between capacity and delay
have been explored [17], [18], [19], [20].
Recently, mobility-assisted routing schemes have at-
tracted much research effort in delay tolerant networks
(DTNs), where mobility is a necessary component of the
routing functionality. In DTNs, mobility is utilized to
reduce the number of transmissions to deliver a message
from the source to the destination. A comprehensive
overview of mobility-assisted routing schemes is provided
in [21]. Here we briefly discuss a few representative
protocols on mobility-assisted epidemic routing schemes.
For example, epidemic routing is employed to achieve
end-to-end message delivery in intermittently connected
networks [10] and [11]. Using epidemic routing to achieve
end-to-end delivery is able to reduce the end-to-end delay
significantly, but it consumes more network resources (e.g.
bandwidth and storage), since all nodes in the network
may serve as relay nodes for the message. For bandwidth
efficiency, a summary vector [10] is used to indicate
whether or not a given message is in the local buffer of
a certain node. When two nodes come into the communi-
cation range of each other, they exchange their summary
vectors. Hence, each node knows which messages it has
not yet received. Then the two nodes exchange messages
accordingly. The protocol based on summary vectors is
designed for partially connected networks, which are usu-
ally sparse networks. A reasonably dense mobile ad hoc
network can be overloaded when many nodes exchange
pairwise summary vectors.
B. Alert Propagation
There are several systems supporting alert propagation
in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. “ContagAlert” [22] is
based on contagion theory. Each node in a P2P network
has several neighboring peers. If its number of alerted
neighbors exceeds a certain threshold, the node becomes
alerted and notifies its neighbors. “Vigilante” [23] sys-
tem adopts self-certifying alerts to guard against Internet
worms and utilizes a small dedicated set of nodes for alert
propagation. However, these techniques do not apply in
the context of mobile ad hoc networks because the implicit
assumptions of these systems are not realistic in mobile ad
hoc networks: first, the network has unlimited bandwidth;
second, the nodes are static. In this paper, our goal is
to design an alert propagation protocol with minimal
bandwidth consumption in mobile ad hoc networks, and
at the same time suppress the malicious alert messages
generated by adversaries.
III. BACKGROUND AND Mobi-Herald ALERT
PROPAGATION FRAMEWORK
A. Attack Model
Mobile ad hoc wireless networks are vulnerable to
various attacks by malicious nodes due to their open mul-
tiple access medium. These malicious nodes (or attackers)
could degrade network performance and even deny legit-
imate nodes of service. We consider two types of active
attacks. In the first type, an adversary may inject illegal
traffic, as well as intercept, interfere, or tamper legitimate
traffic. Attacks of this type are caused by the misbehavior
of attackers, and are referred to as misbehavior attacks.
The second type of attacks is the slander attack, where an
attacker defames a friendly network node by disseminating
illegitimate alert messages. While other network nodes
receive such illegitimate alert messages, they distrust the
victim friendly nodes. In this way, a malicious node may
bring down a portion of the network nodes, and the
network may be partitioned. We define a slanderer as
an adversary that initiates an illegitimate alert message
to defame a friendly node and starts to propagate the
illegitimate alert message.
The shared-medium nature of wireless links facilitates
“neighborhood watch” among peer wireless nodes. The
design of abnormality detection schemes is beyond the
scope of this paper, and has been discussed in [1], [2],
[3], etc. Figure 1 illustrates that the ability of a node to
detect abnormality depends on its location. If a node is
located in the intersection of two circles in Figure 1, it is
able to detect the abnormality of the malicious node.
If all neighbors around a malicious node are aware
of it, the network is immune to the attacks issued by
the malicious node. However, in an arbitrary mobility
pattern, a malicious node can be a neighbor of an arbitrary
network node. Therefore, upon detecting an intrusion by a
malicious node, the detectors need to alert almost all other
network nodes such that the network nodes could adapt
their routing behavior to prevent/nullify future attacks by
the malicious node. However, in the alert propagation
procedure, we must suppress the illegitimate alert message
forged by slanderers. If we simply use an epidemic routing
algorithm to propagate the alert message, the performance
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misbehavior of the attacker
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Fig. 1. Node M is the upstream neighbor of an attacker A, and node
N is the downstream node of the attacker. If a node, say S, is within
the transmission range of both A and M , then the node is able to detect
A’s misbehavior, since S can overhear the message forwarded by M
and the message relayed by A. If the attacker A tampers or maliciously
drops the original packet (data or routing message), then S can sense it.
If the attacker A detours the packet by forwarding the packet to a node
other than N , S can detect it as well.
loss can be doubled under the slander attack. First, friendly
nodes waste bandwidth and energy to spread the illegit-
imate alert message. Second, if all other nodes believe
the illegitimate alert message, the whole network will try
to isolate the victim node identified in the illegitimate
alert message. It is even worse if multiple slanderers
collaborate to defame a set of friendly nodes. Such a
slander attack is a type of denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
B. Design Goals
In this paper, we address the following design concerns:
(1) Efficiency: We desire to distribute messages through
mobile ad hoc networks by consuming minimum aggre-
gated resources, such as network bandwidth. Here, we use
the total number of transmissions for alert message deliv-
ery as a metric for the aggregated resource consumption.
(2) Reliability: We measure the reliability of alert
propagation with the coverage of alert message delivery.
The coverage means the percentage of network nodes
which have received (or confirmed) the alert message.
The alert propagation must balance the conflicting goals
of maximizing coverage of alert message delivery and
minimizing the aggregated resource consumption.
(3) Suppression of Illegitimate Alert Messages: Due to
the presence of slander attacks, alert propagation must
be able to suppress (or impair) illegitimate alert messages
generated by slanderers. We desire a high suppression rate
of illegitimate alert messages.
(4) End-to-end Alert Message Propagation Delay: End-
to-end alert message propagation delay is measured by
the time used for alert propagation. In alert propagation,
we usually do not require immediate delivery of an alert
message to all the network nodes. However, the delay
should not be too large. As long as network nodes are
aware of the alert about the malicious node before the
malicious node moves to their neighborhood, the network
nodes can establish fruitful defense.
C. Assumptions
To make our design fit in a wide range of mobile ad
hoc network systems, our Mobi-Herald protocol does not
require network nodes to maintain neighborhood informa-
tion. To set up context of this paper, we make assumptions
as follows:
(1) Agility: Each network node has a reasonable likeli-
hood of moving around. Network nodes (e.g. pedestrians
and vehicles) may move at various speeds and may halt
for a while from time to time. Hence, agility assumption
is naturally satisfied in mobile ad hoc networks.
(2) Autonomy: Each node has independent control over
its movement and the route of a mobile node is deter-
mined by the node itself. Other nodes cannot interrupt the
movement or predict the trajectory of a mobile node.
D. System Architecture
Mobility-assisted Epidemic Routing
Threshold-based
Verification
Alert Propagation
Management
Periodically propagate
alert message m
Confirm alert
message m
Control alert
propagation
Report received
alert messages
Receive alert
messages
Fig. 2. System architecture of Mobi-Herald alert propagation
Figure 2 depicts the system architecture of Mobi-Herald
alert propagation protocol. The underlying component for
alert message distribution is the epidemic routing compo-
nent, which utilizes node mobility to propagate alert mes-
sages efficiently. Threshold-based verification component
helps to suppress the illegitimate alert messages generated
by slanderers. Before a node confirms the authenticity
of the alert message, it does not actively propagate the
alert message. Assuming k as the maximum number of
collusive slanders, the threshold-based verification con-
firms authenticity of the alert message only when the node
has received more than k copies of the message from
different nodes. Note that it is crucial to correctly estimate
and anticipate parameter k in a mobile ad hoc network,
since the selection of k affects end-to-end delay, message
overhead, reliability and ability to suppress illegitimate
alert messages of alert propagation. Fortunately, k does
not need to be very large for two reasons: First, the
number adversaries which steal IDs and authentication
keys cannot be very large. Second, under the context
of our alert propagation scheme, even if the number of
collusive slanderers exceeds k, the slanderers need to
consume much larger resources to issue slander attacks
if we select a reasonable value for k (details will be
explained in Section V). In a mobile ad hoc network, an
adversary usually has limited resources (bandwidth and
battery), it is not wise for an adversary to sacrifice much
larger resources than a friendly node to issue an attack.
After the threshold-based verification confirms the au-
thenticity of the alert message, the node becomes a
“mobile herald”, and actively participates in the alert
propagation. Alert propagation management component
controls when the alert propagation procedure should
stop by determining a value of Times-to-send (TTS). The
parameter TTS tells epidemic routing component how
many rounds a node forwards the alert message before
the alert propagation stops. It is desired that if all network
nodes have confirmed the authenticity of an alert, the alert
propagation procedure can be terminated and release the
network resources. Otherwise, tremendous bandwidth will
be consumed in vain. Section VI suggests algorithms to
determine a proper TTS value in alert propagation.
IV. Mobility-assisted EPIDEMIC ROUTING
In this section, we will introduce a mobility-assisted
epidemic routing scheme.
A. Advantages of Mobility-assisted Epidemic Routing
Our experiments show that in a reasonably dense
network, it is very likely that flooding protocol (with-
out utilizing mobility) only delivers the message to a
small portion of network node. This is because in a
snapshot view of the network, even though the network
has reasonable density, node mobility frequently causes
uneven node distribution, and results in network partition.
Mobility-assisted routing schemes allow message carriers
to forward the message from different locations, which
is equivalent to “multi-source flooding”. Hence, mobility-
assisted routing schemes can achieve large coverage of
message delivery.
A
B
(a) Coverage of B’s
transmission without
utilizing mobility
A
B
(b) Coverage of B’s transmission
in mobility-assisted protocols
Fig. 3. Mobility helps to disseminate message efficiently: When node
A spreads a message, node B hears it. Without utilizing mobility in (a),
B forwards the message to its neighbors upon reception of the message.
The additional coverage of B’s transmission is shown as the shaded area
in (a). In (b), after B receives the message, it moves from the original
location to a new location, and forwards the message in the new location,
then the message coverage of B’s transmission is the shaded area in (b).
Another advantage of mobility-assisted schemes is that
message retransmissions may achieve larger coverage than
those in static case (see Figure 3). Hence, re-transmissions
in mobility-assisted epidemic routing protocols can be
more efficient. Based on such observation, we design
a mobility-assisted epidemic routing protocol, and then
build the alert propagation protocol on top of it. In
mobility-assisted epidemic routing scheme, an alert mes-
sage carrier, also called a herald, forwards the message
periodically.
B. Overview of Mobility-assisted Epidemic Routing
Without considering slander attacks, upon receiving a
message, a network node becomes a mobile herald and
begins forwarding the message periodically. Each period
between retransmissions of a message has a duration
T . Figure 4 demonstrates the mobility-assisted epidemic
routing protocol. Initially, a node carries a message, and
it serves as a mobile herald. At t = t0, the node (dark
node in Figure 4) broadcasts the message to other 4 nodes
in its neighborhood as shown in Figure 4(a). Thus, t 0
marks the time when the message propagation begins. A
node is alerted if it has received at least one copy of
the alert message. Immediately after t0, 5 nodes have
A(a) At time t = t0
A
(b) At time t = t0 + T
A
(c) At time t = t0 + 2T
A
(d) At time t = t0 + 3T
Fig. 4. Illustration of mobility-assisted epidemic routing
been alerted, and become mobile heralds. During time
[t0, t0+T ), the 5 nodes (dark nodes) carrying the message
move to new locations, and propagate the alert in their
respective neighborhoods in (Figure 4(b)). Note that one
of the 5 nodes suppressed transmission in this period
(we describe the suppress scheme in Section IV-C). In
such a way, more and more nodes become alerted and
serve as mobile heralds (dark nodes) to further propagate
the message (Figure 4(c)). With node mobility, a node
encounters different neighboring nodes from time to time.
In this way, mobile heralds (the nodes which carry a
message) bring the message to more and more nodes, and
more and more nodes become mobile heralds to accelerate
the message propagation. Therefore, after a few steps (e.g.
by time t = t0+3T in Figure 4(d)), almost all the network
nodes have received the message, and thus become alerted.
C. Suppression of Transmissions
For the sake of efficiency in terms of message overhead,
a node should suppress transmission if necessary. Assum-
ing two nodes carry a message in Figure 5, if the two
nodes move to different locations, such that their transmis-
sion areas do not overlap (in Figure 5(a)), then they can
retransmit their copies of the message without redundant
coverage. However, if the two nodes are close enough to
each other, such that one of the retransmissions by these
two nodes does not yield much additional coverage, as
shown in Figure 5(b). In this case, one of the retransmis-
sions could be suppressed to reduce message overhead.
In our mobility-assisted epidemic routing protocol, if a
node hears the transmission of an alert message within a
short period from its neighborhood, the node suppresses
the transmission of the message.
Figure 6 demonstrates message retransmission schedule
at each mobile herald. In order to design efficient suppres-
sion scheme, retransmissions of a message should occur
within a small time slot Δ in each local time period.
Assuming that a node schedules the transmission of a
message at time t, if the node hears the transmission
between [t−Δ−τmax, t), where τmax is the upper bound
of clock drift between two nodes, then it suppresses the
transmission. Upon receiving a message initiated at t0,
each node retransmits the message at most once during
local time [t0 + δT −Δ, t0 + δT ], where δ = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
and Δ  T .
Note, although we use the same T for all message
carriers to retransmit, the nodes are not required to be
A’ B’
A
B
(a) Carriers are far apart from
each other
A’ B’
A
B
(b) Carriers are close
to each other
Fig. 5. Two message carriers move from their original locations A′
and B′ to current locations A and B. If they are apart from each other
in (a), then the covered area by two transmissions are not overlapped,
thus two transmissions yield the maximum coverage. If they are close
to each other, the covered area by two transmissions are reduced, hence
one of the transmissions should be suppressed for efficiency purpose.
Time slot     for transmissions of a message
Local time of
herald A
ΔΔΔ Δ
Δ
T T T
ΔΔΔ Δ
τ
τ:  Time drift between two local clocks
T T T
Transmission Suppressed transmission
Local time of
herald B
Fig. 6. Retransmission schedule of two neighboring heralds
synchronized as long as the value of Δ is not too small.
Actually, the intrinsic imperfect clock synchronization can
help to avoid concurrent transmission in a neighborhood.
Otherwise, randomness is utilized to achieve this goal.
D. Parameter T
In the mobility-assisted protocol, nodes carrying a mes-
sage periodically broadcast the message to its neighbors.
Intuitively, if the period T is large, then the delay of the
message delivery is very large. However, if T is too small,
the neighbors of a node do not change too much from time
t0+(δ−1)T to t0+δT , hence the transmission at t0+δT
only makes the message reach a small number of nodes
which have not received message before. We desire that
the coverage of two continuous transmissions by a mobile
herald has no overlap (in Figure 7). Therefore, we have
T = 2rvavg , where r is the transmission range, and vavg is
the average velocity that a network node moves.
Moving direction
Location of
previous
transmission
Location of
current
transmission
T
r
Fig. 7. Determination of T
E. Algorithm
A times-to-send (TTS) field is included in an alert
message. When a node initiates an alert message m,
it attaches a positive times-to-send (TTS) value to the
message m and serves as a mobile herald of m at time t0.
With the message propagation procedure going on, more
and more network nodes become heralds which actively
propagate message m to their neighbors. These mobile
heralds follow Algorithm 1 for epidemic routing in each
period. At time t0 + δT (δ = 1, 2, 3, · · ·), if TTS is larger
than zero, the mobile heralds reduce the TTS by one and
retransmit message m to their neighbors unless a node
hears someone else has transmitted the message around
time t0 + δT in its neighborhood.
A TTS value indicates the maximum number of trans-
missions that a mobile herald will broadcast an alert
message. For example, the herald node A in Figure 4
transmits its message 4 times, if we set TTS=4. It is an
important design issue to determine TTS in a mobile ad
hoc network so that almost all nodes can receive a message
before TTS of the message reaches zero. We will discuss
this issue in Section VI.
Algorithm 1:
Mobility-assisted Epidemic Routing for a Message m
While (m.TTS > 0) {
Wait for T time slot.
Set m.TTS = m.TTS − 1.
If the node heard the transmission from a
neighbor in [t0 + δT −Δ, t0 + δT ) time slot, where
Δ  T , then
Suppress the transmission;
Else
Transmit the message.
}
V. THRESHOLD-BASED VERIFICATION
Without considering slander attacks, whenever a node
receives a message, the node becomes a mobile herald to
actively propagate the message. However, under the pres-
ence of collusive slander attacks, a network node cannot
tell whether the received alert message is illegitimate and
generated by slanderer nodes. To suppress the propagation
of illegitimate alert messages, we employ threshold-based
verification to fight against collusive slander attacks. We
assume that there are at most k collusive slanderers in
a network, since malicious nodes cannot compromise
arbitrarily large fraction of the network. A friendly node
confirms the authenticity of an alert message only when
it has received more than k alert messages from different
nodes1. Moreover, the friendly node participates in the
alert message propagation (or serves as a mobile herald)
only after it confirms the authenticity of the alert message.
In the threshold-based verification, a threshold value Q =
k+1 is able to defend against at most k collusive attackers
in the system. Note that in the epidemic routing scenario,
where we do not care about slanderers in the system, we
set k = 02. For individual slander attacks, we set k = 1.
A. State Transition in Alert Propagation
We use three states to model a network node in the
alert propagation. Figure V-A illustrates the state transition
diagram of a node in Mobi-Herald alert propagation
scheme. Originally, all nodes are in “unaware” state until
the malicious behavior is detected by at least one detector.
Each detector confirms the alert regarding the malicious
behavior directly, and transits to “confirmed” state. For a
node which does not detect the malicious behavior, the
node switches to “alerted” state upon reception of the
first alert message. In the “alerted” state, a node does not
broadcast the alert message, since the node cannot tell
whether or not the alert is generated by malicious slan-
derers. When a node has collected at least Q messages, it
confirms that the alert message is legitimate. Hence, only
if a node is in the “confirmed” state, it serves as mobile
herald and broadcasts the alert message periodically.
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Fig. 8. State transition diagram of a node for an alert message m
For a threshold Q, the epidemic routing component of
a network node does not suppress the transmission until
it hears Q transmissions in a single time slot.
B. Selection of k
k is an important parameter in threshold-based verifi-
cation. Let us define k˜ as the actual number of collusive
slanderers. It is ideal that we choose k = k˜, but that is not
always possible in practice. However, it is not necessary
to know k˜, and have k match k˜ exactly. Usually, a mobile
adversary has limited resources, hence a wise slanderer
desires to issue slander attack without consuming too
much of its own resources. We can select k so that each
slanderer must consume much more resources than a
1Alert messages are attached with signatures in order to prevent fake
ID attacks.
2Note that there exist misbehavior attacks other than slander attacks,
against which we want to protect the network by disseminating alert
messages.
friendly node to launch a slander attack. If so, the harm of
slander attacks is limited. Consider the case that k˜ = k+1.
Let us compare average message overhead of friendly
nodes and that of malicious slanderers for different k
under Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol in Figure 9.
We infer that k = 3 is a good choice, since with k = 3,
each slanderer consumes much larger resources than a
friendly network node to launch a slander attack via
illegitimate alert messages. This is because k slanderers
need to make at least k + 1 friendly nodes confirm the
alert message in order to successfully launch the slander
attack. But the number of confirmed nodes grows slowly
at the beginning of the alert propagation, because a node
needs to collect enough copies of the alert message from
different user to confirm the alert message. Hence, under
Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol, slanderers must
take efforts to promote an illegitimate alert message at
the beginning. If k is chosen properly, a slanderer may
consume much more resources than a friendly node to
disseminate the illegitimate alert message. From the given
scenario, we can see that k does not need to be large to
impair slander attacks in the system.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of average message overhead, when 600 nodes
under Random Waypoint mobility model are deployed in a 500meter×
500meter area. Transmission range of each node is 30meter.
VI. ALERT PROPAGATION MANAGEMENT
In previous sections, we introduced epidemic routing
and threshold-based verification schemes in Mobi-Herald
alert propagation system. In this section, we address
another important design issue on how to terminate the
alert propagation procedure. If alert propagation of a given
message is terminated early, then it is likely that only a
portion of the network nodes confirms the alert message.
But if the alert propagation procedure is terminated late,
then a large amount of bandwidth can be wasted.
As alluded before, alert propagation management com-
ponent determines parameter TTS, which controls the
termination of alert propagation. We start with deduction
of TTS value for epidemic routing case, where k = 0.
We show that for k = 0 the TTS value has the threshold
property that a certain TTS ensures almost all network
nodes receive the message, but any smaller TTS can barely
achieve it. Later on, we address the determination of TTS
for more general case, where k > 0.
A. Deduction of TTS for Mobility-assisted Epidemic Rout-
ing (without slander attacks (k = 0)
To deduce TTS with k = 0, we assume there are N
nodes in the network and all the nodes remain in an area A
with size |A| during their mission period. A network node
may move arbitrarily within the area A. Pi(t) represents
the position of the node i at time t, and Pi(t) ∈ A.
Transmission range of a wireless node is denoted as r. In
mobile ad hoc networks, node positions follow continuous
processes in continuous time. However, the performance
of the Mobi-Herald protocol depends on the positions of
the mobile heralds when they broadcast the alert message
periodically. Hence, our concerns are the snapshot views
of the network in different periods with an interval T .
If T is large enough to allow a node to move far away
from the position in previous snapshot, then in the next
snapshot the network nodes are able to mix well with
each other. We assume that if the interval T between
two snapshot views of the network is large enough (e.g.
v × T ≥ R), then the position Pi(t + T ) is independent
of Pi(t) (in Figure 10). This assumption is made for the
convenience of the theoretical analysis, however, it is not
the requirement of the Mobi-Herald protocol. Also for
theoretical analysis reasons, we partition incident area A
into hexagons instead of circles. If a node broadcasts a
message, all the neighbors within its transmission range
r can hear the message. We make an approximation that
if a node within the hexagon transmits, all nodes in the
hexagon can hear the transmission (Figure 10).
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Fig. 10. Illustration of a circle incident area
There are M hexagons covering the incident area A.
We estimate M = |A|
6×
√
3
4 r
2
≈ |A|2.6×r2 . Let m be the alert
message to be propagated in the network. The expected
number of nodes which has received the message m at
time t is denoted by X(t), hence X(t) ≥ X(t′) for
t > t′ (X(t) is non-decreasing). The TTS should be
the minimum of δ to make X(t0 + δT ) ≈ N , where
N is the total number of nodes in the network. Given
X(t0 + δT ), Proposition 1 derives the number of alerted
nodes X(t0 +(δ +1)T ) for the next period. Later on, we
utilize Proposition 1 to derive TTS (see Algorithm 2).
Proposition 1: The expected number of nodes which have
received a given message at time t0 + (δ + 1)T satisfies
X(t0 + (δ + 1)T ) ≥ N × (1− e−X(t0+δT ) 1M ).
Proof: For t0 + δT < t < t0 +(δ+1)T , there are X(t0+
δT ) nodes carrying message m. Then the probability that
a given hexagon with radius r does not contain any node
which has received the message m is (1 − 1M )X(t0+δT ).
Hence, at time t0 + (δ + 1)T , the expected number of
hexagons which contain at least one node carrying the
message m is M(1 − (1 − 1M )X(t0+δT )). Since each
hexagon contains NM nodes on average, we have:
X(t0 + (δ + 1)T ) =
N
M
{M [1− (1 − 1
M
)X(t0+δT )]}
= N −N × (1 − 1
M
)X(t0+δT ) (1)
≥ N × (1 − e−X(t0+δT ) 1M ).
Note that X(t) is non-decreasing. Based on Proposition
1, we device an algorithm to determine TTS of the
mobility-assisted epidemic routing as follows.
Algorithm 2: Estimation of TTS
(1) Given network size N and M = |A|2.6×r2 .
(2) Initialize δ = 0, X(t0) = 1.
(3) While (X(t0 + δT ) < N
do {
X(t0 + (δ + 1)T ) = N − N (1 −
1
M )
X(t0+δT );
δ + +;
}
(4) Return TTS = δ.
Let’s consider an example in the circle incident area A
with radius R (in Figure 10), the size of the incident area
can be approximated as |A| = πR2. Figure 11 shows the
theoretical result of TTS depending on density of the net-
work and according to Algorithm 2. Our observation is that
the proposed mobility-assisted epidemic routing protocol
is more efficient in a denser network. In Figure 11, average
degree of a network is defined as the average number
of neighbors within the transmission range of a node, so
average degree indicates node density in a network.
10 15 20 25 30
0
5
10
15
The ratio of R to r
TT
S V
alu
es
Average degree = 5
Average degree =10
Average degree =15
Average degree =20
Fig. 11. Analytical results on epidemic routing protocol
Next, we show via simulations that when k = 0,
the message propagation demonstrates threshold behavior.
Let us consider Random Waypoint mobility model, and
assume square incident area with size |A| = 500×500m2,
transmission range r = 30 and network size N =
600. According to the analytical result by Algorithm 2,
we can deduce TTS=6 for message distribution. In our
experiment, among 30 runs of simulations, 29 runs take 6
periods to deliver the message to at least 98% percent of
the network nodes (as shown in 12). Only one run takes
5 periods to deliver the message to 98% of all nodes.
It shows threshold behavior in the message propagation,
so that with TTS = 6, almost all nodes receive a copy
of the message, but with TTS < 6, the chance that the
message can be delivered to the whole network is very
small. Such threshold behavior implies that an initiator of
a message may attach a predetermined value of TTS to the
message from the beginning of the message propagation
procedure, so that the message can be propagated to the
whole network within TTS periods. We can see that the
simulation results and the theoretical analysis agree with
each other.
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98% coverage for k = 0
B. Determination of TTS for Alert Propagation (with
individual or colluding slanderers k > 0)
Assuming k possible collusive attackers, Mobi-Herald
alert propagation uses threshold-based verification to de-
fend against collusive slander attacks. Only if a node
cumulatively hears more than k nodes transmitting the
alert message, then the node confirms the alert message.
However, we observe that for k > 0, TTS no longer
demonstrates the threshold behavior. For example, Fig-
ure 13 shows the distribution of required TTS to deliver
a message to 98% of network nodes for k = 2 (Q = 3)
case. According to 30 runs of experiments, the required
TTS for alert propagation varies from 13 to 20 in our
experiments. In this case, a predetermined TTS cannot
guarantee both high coverage of message delivery and low
message overhead at the same time. Hence, it is not proper
to use a predetermined TTS for alert propagation when
k > 0. Next, we will show how to determine TTS based
on on-line observation of message transmission.
1) Proliferation of an Alert Message: Define X(t) as
the expected number of nodes which have received Q =
k + 1 alert messages and confirm an alert message by
time t. We will show that X(t) grows quickly when X(t)
is larger than a certain threshold, say N kTH for k. But
before X(t) reaches the threshold, X(t) grows slowly.
When X(t) ≥ NkTH , we say that the alert message is in
the proliferation stage.
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98% coverage for k = 2
Proposition 2: Let M = |A|2.6×r2 be the number of
hexagons covering the incident area A (see Figure 10).
We can infer X(t0 + (δ + 1)T ) based on X(t0 + δT ) as
follows:
X(t0+(δ+1)T ) ≥ N×
X(t0+δT )∑
i=k+1
(X(t0+δT )M )
i e−
X(t0+δT )
M
i!
Proof: X(t0 + (δ + 1)T ) represents the expected num-
ber of nodes which have verified the alert message
at the (δ + 1)-th period. (
X(t0+δT)
M )
i e−
X(t0+δT )
M
i! ≈(
X(t0 + δT )
i
)
(1− 1M )X(t0+δT )−i( 1M )i represents the
probability that a hexagon with radius r contains exactly
i nodes which have verified the alert. Therefore, NM ×
M×
X(t0+δT )∑
i=k+1
(
X(t0+δT )
M )
i e−
X(t0+δT )
M
i! the number of nodes
which have verified the alert by receiving at least k + 1
copies of an alert message in period [t0+δT, t0+(δ+1)T ].

Proposition 2 outlines the lower bound of X(t0 + δT )
under Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol. This lower
bound is obtained in the scenario that a node confirms an
alert only when the node hears more than k nodes trans-
mitting the alert message in interval (t0+(δ−1)T, t0+δT ].
In Mobi-Herald alert propagation, if a node cumulatively
hears more than k nodes transmitting the alert message
in interval [t0, t0 + δT ], then the node confirms the alert
message at time t0 + δT . Consider a network with N =
1500 nodes, and M = 100. According to Proposition
2, we calculate the lower bound of X(t). Figure 14
implies that when X(t0 + δT ) ≥ NkTH , X(t0 + δT ) will
reach N in few periods. This means that as long as the
number of confirmed nodes exceeds N kTH , the alert will
be confirmed by almost all the nodes very quickly. In
Figure 14, N 1TH = 15, N2TH = 86, N3TH = 190, and
N4TH = 315.
Since the proliferation of an alert message implies that
the alert message will be propagated to the whole network
in a few steps, it can be used to predict the advent of
termination of the alert propagation. At the very beginning
of Mobi-Herald alert propagation (at time t0), only a
few nodes (detectors of malicious behavior) confirm the
alert. Hence only a small number of nodes propagate the
alert message to their neighborhood. With more and more
network nodes having received more than k copies of the
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Fig. 14. After δ = h periods when the expected number of confirmed
nodes exceeds a certain threshold NkTH , the alert message will be
propagated to the whole network very soon.
alert message, these nodes confirm the alert message and
participate in alert propagation. Then, the alert message is
proliferated. In the proliferation stage of an alert message,
a node is likely to hear Q = k+1 transmissions of the alert
message in a single period. Here, we take the evidence of
Q = k + 1 transmissions by a node in a single period
as an indicator of proliferation of an alert message. Next,
we discuss how to terminate the alert propagation, when
a node hears Q transmissions in a single period.
2) Managing TTS for Alert Propagation: Figure 12
shows that a predetermined TTS is not feasible for k > 0,
since the variation of required TTS is large. So the TTS
value needs to be adjusted based on the on-line detection
of the proliferation of an alert message. At the beginning
of the alert propagation, we assign a large TTS number,
say 50, to an alert message m (i.e. set m.TTS=50).
While a network node cumulatively receives Q or
more copies of the alert message, it confirms the alert
message m and begins to propagate m as a herald. At
this time, the epidemic routing component of the herald
node sets its m.TTS as the minimum of the received TTS
values. A herald node reduces its m.TTS by one after each
transmission period. When any network node observes the
proliferation of the alert messages by hearing Q = k + 1
copies of m in a single period, the node realizes that all
network nodes will confirm the alert message m very soon.
So the node calculates TTS according to Algorithm 2 by
the alert propagation management component, and passes
the TTS value to the epidemic routing component. As the
epidemic routing component receives the TTS from the
alert propagation management component, it updates its
m.TTS to set m.TTS=min{TTS,m.TTS}.
While hearing transmissions of the alert message by
other mobile heralds, a herald node compares the smallest
received TTS with its own m.TTS, and takes the smallest
value as its own m.TTS. Usually, Algorithm 2 yields a
small TTS value comparing to the initially assigned TTS.
Hence, after a few periods since the first node observes the
proliferation of the alert message, the majority of network
nodes will reduce their own m.TTS values to zero, thus
they will terminate the alert propagation procedure. In
the case that a very few mobile heralds may not be able
to receive the signal (a small TTS) to terminate the alert
propagation before the rest of the network nodes stop the
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Fig. 15. Delay of alert propagation
alert propagation, these herald nodes will keep forwarding
the alert message. However, when a friendly node still
hears the transmission of alert message after its m.TTS
reaches zero, it will send a mandatory “STOP” signal to
those heralds. Hence, all the herald nodes will be aware
of the termination of alert propagation easily.
VII. EVALUATION
We have presented Mobi-Herald protocol for alert prop-
agation in previous sections, where we derived relevant
parameters through theoretical analysis. In this section,
we evaluate the performance of the proposed Mobi-Herald
protocols in terms of the end-to-end delay, the ability to
suppress or impair slanderers, the coverage (or reliability)
of message delivery, and the efficiency of alert propagation
through simulations.
A. Simulation Setup
In this section, we investigate the Mobi-Herald alert
propagation protocol under a commonly used mobility
model, Random Waypoint mobility model, where a node
pauses and moves. A node under Random Waypoint
mobility model moves from its current position to a
new randomly selected location (destination) at a random
speed. The pause time of a node is also randomly chosen
when it reaches the destination. After the pause time, the
node chooses a new destination, speed, and pause time.
This procedure is followed by every node until it reaches
the end of simulation. We set the maximum pause time as
60 second and the range of moving speed is from 0.5mps
(meter per second) to 5mps in the simulation.
We assume that the ad hoc network spans a square
area with edge length L = 500meter. We use variant
transmission range r and the network size N to simulate
different network diameters and different node densities in
the network. We also change threshold value Q to study
how Q affects end-to-end delay, coverage of alert message
delivery and message overhead in the alert propagation.
We randomly select a malicious node and detectors around
the malicious node. These detectors generate alert mes-
sages regarding the malicious node and serve as mobile
heralds to transmit alert messages periodically. The period
of message transmission is T = 1 minute.
B. End-to-end Delay of Alert Propagation
In the simulation, the delay of the alert propagation is
the total time needed to propagate an alert message to
the whole network. When Q = 1, the alert propagation is
reduced to epidemic routing case. The node density of a
network is represented by the average degree d. With L,
r and network size N , we can estimate d = N L2πr2 − 1
for circular transmission areas. Figure 15 shows the delay
of the alert propagation, which represents how long it will
take for all the network nodes to confirm the alert message.
Each of the results represents the average of 10 simulation
runs. We can observe that the threshold value Q, node
density, and transmission range affect the delay of the
alert propagation. First, the larger Q is, the more copies
of a message must be collected before a node actively
propagates the alert message. Every node must wait longer
time before it confirms an alert message. Hence the delay
increases along the threshold value Q. Second, we expect
a less delay of alert propagation in a denser network,
because the denser a network is, the more nodes receive
the alert message in each step. Third, with the same node
density (average degree) and the same Q value, a larger
transmission range implies smaller L/r ratio (network
diameter), which means that we can use smaller hops to
cover the whole network. Hence, it takes a shorter time
to propagate an alert throughout the network with a larger
transmission range r. With the delays shown in Figure15,
majority of network nodes are able to establish defense in
time against the detected misbehavior malicious nodes.
C. CDF of Alert Propagation
Let us examine the CDF (Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion) of message delivery in Mobi-Herald protocol, which
demonstrates the probability distribution of confirmed
nodes for a given alert message at each period. Figure
16 shows the CDF, when we take the transmission range
r = 30. It indicates that 100% of network nodes can finally
confirm an alert message when TTS exceeds a certain
value. Also, in a denser network, the CDF of alert message
delivery converges to 1 faster. This is because in a denser
network, one transmission of an alert message can reach
more nodes.
In Figure 16, we observe that the number of confirmed
nodes grows slowly at the beginning, but it proliferates
when the number of confirmed nodes exceeds a certain
threshold and the alert message will be confirmed by
the whole network in a few periods. This observation
agrees the analytical result we obtained in Section VI-B.
Such observation implies that even if Q or more collusive
slanderers exist in the system, slanders must make efforts
to promote the illegitimate alert messages at the beginning,
in order to launch a slander attack. This will damage
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Fig. 16. CDF of alert message delivery under Mobi-Herald alert propagation scheme
the resource limited slanderers themselves. Therefore, we
conclude that the Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol
is able to fully suppress Q−1 collusive slanders or impair
Q or more collusive slanders in an mobile ad hoc network.
The larger Q is, the better we can suppress/impair the
collusive slanderers. However, a larger end-to-end delay
and more transmissions will be expected for a larger Q.
But as shown in Figure 9, Q does not need to be very large
to achieve good performance to suppress/impair collusive
slanderers.
D. Coverage of Alert Propagation
The coverage of alert propagation exhibits the reliability
of the alert propagation. The coverage is measured by
percentage of network nodes, which confirm a given alert
message by cumulatively receiving at least Q copies of
the alert message from different forwarders.
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Fig. 17. Comparison of coverage: flooding v.s. Mobi-Herald
In our Mobi-Herald alert propagation protocol, the
Alert Propagation Management component determines
TTS value in order to balance the coverage of the alert
propagation and message overhead. Here, we investigate
the coverage of alert propagation under the proposed
scheme. Figure 17 compares the coverage of alert propa-
gation by a flooding-based protocol and the Mobi-Herald
protocol. In the flooding-based protocol, upon receiving
Q copies of the same alert message assigned by different
users, a network node forwards the Q copies of the alert
message to its neighbors. Therefore, even if a network
node has less than Q neighbors, the node is still able to
confirm the alert message in the flooding-based protocol.
Figure 17(a) and Figure 17(b) illustrate the coverage of
flooding-based protocol and Mobi-Herald alert propaga-
tion protocol respectively. d represents the average in the
simulation scenarios. Each of the results is based on the
average of 10 simulation runs. As Q turns to be large
and node density is low, we can see the coverage of alert
message delivery under the flooding-based protocol can
be very low. In contrast, the coverage of alert message
delivery is quite encouraging.
E. Communication Efficiency of Alert Propagation
We have shown that Mobi-Herald alert propagation
protocol achieves high coverage of alert message delivery.
Next, we study the message overhead of Mobi-Herald
protocol. To make a fair comparison of Mobi-Herald
protocol and the flooding-based protocol, we define nor-
malized message overhead as the average transmissions
needed to cover each network node. The normalized
message overhead is measured by the ratio of the num-
ber of transmissions to the number of confirmed nodes,
i.e. Overheadmsg = # of transmissions# of confirmed nodes .
In the above mentioned flooding-based protocol, we
can easily conclude that the normalized message overhead
is Q, since each confirmed node forwards Q copies of
the alert message. The normalized message overhead of
Mobi-Herald protocol is obtained through simulations as
shown in Figure 18. We observe that only in a sparse
network (e.g. average degree of network nodes d = 2), the
normalized message overhead of Mobi-Herald protocol is
larger than Q. In reasonable dense networks (e.g. d ≥ 4),
Mobi-Herald protocol achieves much smaller normalized
message overhead than that of the flooding-based scheme.
However, in sparse network the coverage of alert message
delivery is very small by the flooding-based protocol, and
the reliability of alert propagation suffers from frequent
network partitions. Since Mobi-Herald achieves much
better coverage of alert propagation in sparse network, the
message overhead of Mobi-Herald is satisfactory.
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The paper presented a novel alert (or message) propaga-
tion protocol, which relies on periodically retransmission
of the alert messages by mobile network nodes.To prevent
the malicious nodes from utilizing alert propagation to
issue DoS attacks, we adopt a threshold-based verification
scheme, where a node confirms an alert only when it has
received at least Q copies of the same alert message from
different nodes. To use minimum message overhead to
achieve network-wide alert message delivery, the transmis-
sions of an alert message is limited by the parameter TTS.
When Q = 1, the TTS value demonstrates the threshold
property that a certain TTS guarantees almost all network
nodes confirm the alert, but any smaller TTS can barely
achieve it. We deduce the value of TTS to achieve the
threshold behavior by theoretical analysis, and verify it
through simulation. When Q > 1, there does not exist
the threshold behavior. Hence, it is improper to attach a
predetermined TTS at the beginning of alert propagation.
In this case, only when a node detects the evidence of
the proliferation of an alert message, it begins attaching a
small TTS to the alert message. Hence, the alert propaga-
tion can be terminated in time to avoid extra bandwidth
consumption when the whole network confirms the alert.
Our simulation is based on Random Waypoint mobility
model. The simulation results show that the Mobi-Herald
alert propagation achieves very high coverage of message
delivery with reasonable message overhead and acceptable
delay. In the future, we will evaluate Mobi-Herald alert
propagation protocol with the real world mobility trace.
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